In this paper we assess the effectiveness of large scale bailouts aiming at preventing a financial crisis from further propagating into a systemic risk. We examine the structural changes in the relationship between the sovereign and financial institutions' credit default swap spreads during the European sovereign debt crisis. Before the first Greek bailout by the EFSF, the sovereign and financial sectors exhibit a two-way feedback effect for both the short and the long runs. Crucially, we find that after the first Greek bailout, shocks in the financial sector either exert significantly negative impacts or lose influences on the sovereign sector. In contrast, all the later bailouts by the EFSF (the second Greek bailout, Irish and Portugal bailouts) do not show this pattern change in the two-way risk transfer relationship.
Introduction
The unsustainable Greek sovereign debt came to a brink of imminent default in early 2010. Propagated by the Eurozone banks' significant holdings in the Greek sovereign debt, the "Greek crisis" contagiously affected the financial sector and sovereign debt in the other Eurozone countries. Subsequently complicated by the public debt crises of Ireland, Portugal and Spain 1 , the Greek crisis was rolled into a fully-fledged European sovereign debt crisis (the Eurozone crisis). The unprecedented Eurozone crisis has caused significant concerns to the policymakers.
A new institution called the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) has since been founded by 17 Eurozone countries. The EFSF issued its first rescue package on 9 May 2010 for up to €750 billion to ensure the financial stability of Greece (G1). This is then followed by the rescue packages for Ireland on 25 January 2011 (I),
Portugal on 15 June 2011 (P) and the second bailout to Greece on 21 July 2011 (G2).
2
The goal of this paper is to understand the ways by which default risk is transferred, if any, between the sovereign countries and the domestic financial institutions during the European sovereign debt crisis. We assess the effectiveness of large scale government bailouts that aim at preventing a financial crisis from being further propagated into a two-way systemic risk.
We focus on six Eurozone countries including: Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain (the GIIPS countries) and Germany 3 . We use daily credit default swap (CDS) spreads to capture default risk, and analyze the risk transfer between sovereign and domestic financial institutions in each country from November 2007 to October 2012. We examine the structural changes in the 1 The sovereign debt crisis in Ireland was triggered by the previous Irish banking crisis in 2008 stemming from a property bubble financed by the six state guaranteed banks. The Portugal crisis was caused by the increased public expenses such as high management costs and increased bonuses and wages to the government officers. Spain also had a housing bubble. As the housing bubble burst, the banking crisis transferred to the sovereign debt.
relationship between the CDS series of sovereign countries and financial institutions.
First, we explore the dynamic cointegration relationship with endogenous regime shifts using the model of Hansen and Seo (2002) . From the analysis, we identify typical and atypical regimes where these relationships differ. The regime containing higher percentage of observations is identified as the typical regime, whereas the other is the atypical regime. We find that the identified threshold determines the regime shifts between the typical and atypical regimes. The atypical regime mainly resides during those periods surrounding the global credit crunch (2007) (2008) and the Eurozone crisis (2010).
Further, for each of the bivariate relationships between sovereign and financial institutions, we use the model of Gregory and Hansen (1996) to detect the unknown timing of the structural breaks, which are reflected in the changes in the intercept or the slope coefficients of the model. We find that the dates of the significant breakpoints are close to the four bailouts (G1, I, P and G2) issued by the EFSF. We then use the four EFSF bailouts as the breakpoints for all the countries and investigate the changes in the default risk transfer in the pre-and post-bailout periods.
We are careful in sample coverage, and our methodology is flexible and robust to accommodate both exogenous and unobservable regime break points. Our sample period extending to 2012 allows a lengthy coverage on recent crisis evolvement and a useful time-window for analyzing the effectiveness of the EFSF bailouts. We identify regimes with the model of Hansen and Seo (2002) and verify the break points by using the model of Gregory and Hansen (1996) to detect the unknown timing of structural breaks. We find that the structural breaks coincide with the EFSF bailouts. Consequently, we use the first Greek bailout (May 2010) for the breakpoint, which is after the breakpoint surrounding the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in Acharya et al. (2014) .
We find that, prior to the first Greek bailout (G1), positive interdependencies exist between the default risk of the sovereign and financial institutions. Specifically, a shock in the sovereign CDS spread of a country is followed by increases in the CDS spread of the financial institutions in that country, and vice versa.
Most importantly we find that, after the first Greek bailout, the financial-to-sovereign risk transfer for the GIIPS countries that have high sovereign default risk becomes either insignificant or negative. This evidence indicates that the default risks of financial institutions lose their positive impacts on the sovereign default risk. In contrast, the strong and positive influences of the sovereign default risk on its domestic financial institutions remain.
On the contrary, Germany as the main EFSF guarantees is not in the two-way feedback loop even before the bailouts issued. Intuitively, the GIIPS countries are the main beneficiaries of the bailouts, the financial-to-sovereign risk transfer in the GIIPS countries breaks down after the bailouts. The evidence suggests that since the G1 bailout is supported by the EFSF guarantee countries, the bank-to-sovereign risk transfer in the two-way feedback breaks down, and the sovereign risk is transferred to the other bailout guarantees.
Moreover, for later bailouts in Greece (the second bailout), Ireland and Portugal, we find that the default risk transfer from financial sector to government becomes insignificant. This evidence supports the initiative of large-scale bailouts by the EFSF: the first Greek bailout (G1) has been a success in breaking the bank-to-sovereign risk transfer, and in ending the two-way feedback loop. These effects are not only beneficial for Greece, but also for the other countries such as Ireland, Portugal and Spain. Our evidence derives a policy implication that a determined large bailout, such as G1, is indeed capable of preventing the exaggeration of risk transfer from the financial to the sovereign sector.
Previous theoretical literature on the bank bailouts mainly focuses on the costs and benefits of the bank bailouts at the individual level (Mailath and Mester (1994)) and at the aggregate level of the banking sector (Penati and Protopapadakis (1988) and Acharya and Yorulmazer (2007) ). While on the other hand, the theoretical literature on the sovereign default risk focuses on the collateral impacts of sovereign defaulting on the financial sector through bank holdings of the government debt from domestic or foreign countries (Broner et al. (2008) , Acharya and Rajan (2013) and Gennaioli et al. (2010) ). Acharya et al. (2014) consider the effects from the both sides and define the default risk transfer between the sovereign and financial sectors as a "two-way feedback" effect.
Previous empirical studies on financial crisis before 2010 show that increases in sovereign default risk may reduce foreign credit to the domestic private sectors via a decline in credit supply (see, e.g., Drudi and Giordano 2000; Dooley and Verma 2001; and Tomz and Wright 2008) . The increased sovereign default risk also causes a decrease in the aggregate demand of credit. Kim and Wu (2008) show that sovereign credit ratings raise sovereign credit ratings have positive impacts on domestic stock markets and the banking sector. The other related study is Alter and Schüler (2012) who analyze the impacts of bank bailouts during the period 2007-2010 on the interdependencies between the sovereign and banking sectors, and conclude that the contagion (default risk transfer within domestic countries) disperses into different directions after the bank bailouts. Acharya et al. (2014) use OLS to estimate relation between the changes in CDS of the banking and the sovereign sector and find that positive "two-way feedback"
interdependencies exist between the sovereign and the financial default risks during the post-bailout period. They interpret that since governments and banks hold debts of each other, a bailout injection into the banking sector could cause a two-way feedback effect between the two sectors. In contrast, our study sheds important insight into the effectiveness of large scale bailouts in preventing a financial crisis, while our evidence complements the findings of Acharya et al. (2014) . Our evidence shows that, before the first Greek bailout, the risk transfers have been positive, both sovereign-to-banks and the banks-to-sovereign, indicating that these countries have entered into a feedback loop. Our finding of the two-way feedback between the sovereign and financial sectors during the pre-bailout period, which covers the whole sample period in Acharya et al. (2014) , is consistent with Acharya et al. (2014) .
The remaining parts of the paper are organised as follows. Section 2 explains the mechanism of risk transfer between the sovereign and financial sectors. We use Greece for illustration purpose as our evidence points toward the effectiveness of the first Greek bailout. Section 3 describes the data and our sample. Section 4 explains our estimation methodology. Section 5 analyzes the results and reports our findings.
Section 6 concludes.
The Risk Transfer Mechanism
In Figure 1 we illustrate the risk-transfer mechanism in the case of Greece. As detailed in our analysis later, before the first Greek bailout issued by the EFSF, a "two-way feedback" effect exists between the default risks of sovereign and the financial sector, indicating positive interdependences. After Greece starts the application of the EFSF bailout to support its financial sector, the bailout burden is shared by the other EFSF guarantees such as Germany and even by the whole Eurozone in the short run. The Greek government then receives the bailout from the EFSF guarantees. Thus, instead of Greece taking over the debt of its own financial sector, the default risk gets transferred to other Eurozone countries. Hence, the bank-to-sovereign risk transfer in this two-way feedback loop breaks down after the EFSF bailouts issued. We term this as the "Greek effect". . "Two-way feedback" loop using Greece as an example. Before any bailout interventions, a "two-way feedback" effect exists between the default risks of sovereign and the domestic financial sector of Greece and other countries. After the bailouts, the positive feedback from the Greek financial sector to the Greek sovereign sector might be broken down and transferred to other countries, as the other Eurozone guarantee countries are taking over the bailout debt burdens together
The result of this Greek effect is the lack of "the two-way feedback effect" when Ireland and Portugal received bailouts from the EFSF later. This is because the default risk had already been priced during the first Greek bailout. This reflects the perception of market participants in that these countries may also request and would be granted bailouts from the EFSF in the future. Thus the price of the default has been adjusted after the first Greek bailout.
Our findings also indicate that the outcomes of other bailouts are heterogeneous among the European countries. The private-to-public risk transfer was influenced in
Ireland, Portugal and Spain during the first Greek bailout, but not in other countries such as Germany which has more stable financial system. Dieckmann and Plank (2012) report that the states of the financial system at the beginning of the financial crisis have strong explanatory power for the private-to-public risk transfer, and that an Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) member is more sensitive to the health of its pre-crisis financial system.
On the other hand, "the two-way feedback" effect between a government and its own domestic financial sectors prior to the first Greek bailout issued by the EFSF can be understood as follows. When a country faces financial distress, be it stemming from high public deficit or heavy debt burdens, the sovereign default risk of this country rises and the sovereign debt devalues. In the short run, (i) for the domestic financial institutions the cost of holding the sovereign debt is higher, which impacts the balance sheet of the financial institutions; (ii) for other governments that support the financially distressed country by providing bailout packages, the sovereign and financial sectors of the supporting countries also face higher default risk for holding the devaluated sovereign debt. The financial systemic risk, which is the impacts of macroeconomic factors on banking credit risk, is procyclical to the business cycle or macroeconomic environment (see, Borio et al. 2002; Marcucci and Quagliariello 2009; and Festic, et al. 2011) . In the long run, sovereign debt crises are followed by reductions in foreign capital inflows as investors' awareness to the sovereign default risk increases, and the domestic credit becomes more expensive, which negatively affects the domestic economy and hence increase the default risk of the domestic financial institutions.
Likewise, increased default probability of a financial institution increases the likelihood that the counterparties may find themselves facing funding difficulties, thereby increasing the default risk of the counterparties. A systemic financial crisis thus arises and hampers the economy, which in turn, deteriorates public finances, resulting in higher sovereign default risk.
In order to combat a potential systemic financial crisis, a government can issue a bailout to domestic financial institutions via increasing taxes or diluting existing government debt (hence raising the insolvency ratio). However, bailouts are costly, and increased taxation transfers the burden of default risk from the public to the private sectors. A Government that issues bailouts has to sacrifice its credit risk, which means that domestic bailouts can drive the risk transfer into a vicious two-way feedback loop.
Data and Sample
Our analysis uses credit default swap (CDS) spreads to capture credit default risk of an institution, or the government. Prior studies have shown that CDS spreads can measure investors' risk preference. According to Hull et al. (2004) , both changes and levels of CDS spread contain significant information in estimating the probability of rating events. Changes in CDS spread are conditional on rating events, and downgrade announcements and negative outlooks do not have helpful information. Ismailescu and Kazemi (2010) analyze the relationship between the sovereign CDS spreads and the sovereign credit ratings, and show that investors can make decisions according to the same public information that would lead to the changes in CDS spreads prior to a rating announcement. Düllmann and Sosinska (2007) down since the second Greek bailout (G2). The CDS spreads of the institutions increased after the Greek first bailout (G1), and then reached the peak at the second Greek bailout (G2).
[Insert Figure 2] 
Estimation Methodology
We analyze the default risk between the sovereign and financial sectors in two stages. 8 First, we apply the model of Hansen and Seo (2002) to test a threshold relationship in dynamic regimes and apply the model by Gregory and Hansen (1996) to detect the structural breaks in each bivariate relationship. We examine and that the 7 On 9 May 2010, the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) set out the first bailout package to Greece worth up to €750 billion aiming at rescuing financial stability across the European countries. 8 Prior to the estimation of the VAR and VEC models, we test the unit roots of the log-level CDS spreads and the first differences of the log levels using the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test (detailed results available on request). To test the cointegration of the I(1) variables for each bivariate model, Johansen's trace tests are applied except for the ADF tests (see Appendix 1). If the variable in log-levels can be cointegrated, i.e., reject maximum rank at 0 or 1, we proceed to estimate the VEC.
The optimal lag order p in the VAR and the VEC models is determined by, on the one hand, minimising the common information criteria in the underlying VAR model of the log-levels, and on the other hand considering autocorrelations of the residuals and joint tests of reducing unnecessary lags in the models. The VEC model is estimated via Johansen's maximum likelihood method and the VAR model via ordinary least squares.
structural breaks coincide with the EFSF bailouts. We then use the breakpoints for all the countries to investigate the changes in the default risk in the pre-and post-bailout periods.
Second, to examine the long-run cointegration between the two sectors, we use the vector autoregression (VAR) and the vector error correction (VEC) models in each of the periods of the identified regimes. For the short-run analysis, we apply the impulse response functions (IRFs) to capture the differences of shock transmitting mechanism between banks and country. Since each bank responds differently to shocks in a country, we estimate IRFs separately for each pair of bank and country.
As such, there is no common market-wide effect. We control for bank and sovereign fixed effects by estimating the models separately for each pair of bank and country.
Two-Regime Threshold Cointegration in VEC Model
We estimate threshold VEC models using the variables cds Sov,t , the log of sovereign CDS spreads (in short 'Sov') and cds Fi,t , the log of CDS spreads of a domestic financial institution (in short 'Fi'), as proposed by Hansen and Seo (2002 
, which is the estimated cointegrating relationship between the two CDS series. Once the threshold (γ) is estimated and conditioned, the regime with higher percentage of observations is defined as the typical regime, and the other is defined as the atypical regime. In the typical regime, have minimal error-correction effects and minimal dynamics. In the atypical regime the two series deviate more from the long-term cointegration, meaning that the error-correction effect is stronger.
Testing the Unknown Timing of Structural Breakpoints
We also apply the models of Gregory and Hansen (1996) to detect statistical breakpoints in each bivariate relationship, and to check whether the actual bailout events coincide with the statistical breakpoints. The model of Gregory and Hansen (1996) treats the timing of a structural change as unknown. The structural change would be reflected in changes in the intercept and/or the slope coefficients. The models are expressed as a Level Shift (C) when there is a break in the intercept only, or a Regime Shift (C/S) when there is a break in the intercept and the slope of the cointegrating relationship.
The null hypothesis is that there is no cointegration between the two variables in the presence of a regime shift at unknown timing. The ADF-, Z α -, and Z t -type tests are taken to test the null hypothesis, and the critical values are calculated by simulation methods.
IRF of VAR and VEC Models: Pre-and Post-Bailout Periods
The analysis in Section 4.2 shows that there are breaks near the EFSF bailouts. We therefore use the VAR and VEC models to analyse the pre-and post-bailout risk transfer between the sovereign and financial sectors. Subsequently, we use the EFSF bailouts as the breakpoints for the whole period. For example, for the first Greek bailout, we use the bailout date as the only breakpoint to separate the data into the pre-and the post-bailout sub-periods and analyze the bivariate relationship in each country in both the sub-periods. We estimate the VAR and VEC models with a sovereign CDS spread and a domestic financial institution's CDS spread.
We use impulse response functions (IRF) of VAR models using the log CDS spreads. IRFs are used to depict the impacts of one-time shock to a 'Sov' (a domestic 'Fi') within one standard deviation not only on the 'Sov' ('Fi') itself but also on the domestic 'Fi' ('Sov') of current (1, 2 and 5 days) and future (22 days) periods.
Empirical Findings

Results from Two-Regime Threshold VEC Model
This section reports the estimation of Hansen and Seo's (2002) model for detecting typical and atypical regimes and for testing cointegrating relationship between the default risk of the sovereign debts and financial institutions.
[Insert Table 1, 2 and 3] Tables 1, 2 and 3 show the cointegration results of the linear VEC model without threshold, typical regime and atypical regime, respectively. For exposition purpose, we use as an example the log CDS spreads of Greek sovereign debt and the log CDS spreads of Alpha Bank (see Table 1 , 2 and 3). The estimated VEC without a threshold effect is given below , and the estimated threshold is -1.001.
The estimated threshold VEC is shown below: analyze the impulse responses of all the GIIPS countries in different regimes. Table 4 shows the impulse responses of the five countries in the two regimes. The responses after 1, 2, and 5 days represent the short-term effect, and the responses after 22 days show the long-run effect. For example, in the typical regime, the responses of Alpha Bank to the impulse in Greek Sov after 1, 2 and 5 days are 0.04, 0.06 and 0.09, respectively, and the response after 22 days is 0.27. The responses of Greek Sov to the impulse in Alpha Bank after 1, 2 and 5 days are -0.01, -0.02 and -0.04, respectively, and the response after 22 days is -0.11.
[Insert Table 4 ] We observe that, for the GIIPS countries except Greece, in the typical regime, a two-way feedback effect exists between the default risk of the sovereign and financial sectors, as most of the responses of financial institutions to the sovereign CDS shocks are significantly positive, and vice versa, in both the short and long run. default risk to the sovereign default risk increase for these countries, and vice versa.
In comparison, the interdependent relationship between the sovereign and financial sectors of Greece is different from other GIIPS countries. In the typical regime, the impact of sovereign default risk on the default risk of the domestic financial sector is positively significant, whereas the impact of domestic financial sector on the sovereign sector remains insignificant. In the atypical regime for Greece, the impacts of the sovereign default risk on the default risk of the financial institutions are reduced to zero. In a sharp contrast, the sovereign default risk exhibits strong and negative responses to the shock in the default risk of the financial institutions. For example, in the atypical regime, the responses of Greek Sov to the impulse in Alpha Bank after 1, 2 and 5 days are -34.99, -33.03 and -24.83, respectively. Such heterogeneous results in Greece indicate that in the atypical regime the negative force of the impact of the financial sector on the sovereign default risk is much stronger than the positive force. This is because the state of the financial system of a country since the beginning of the financial crisis has strong explanatory power for the private-to-public risk transfer. For Greece, as the government debt has been already relatively high before and at the beginning of the credit crunch period, the sensitivity of the sovereign default risk to a shock in the domestic financial sector is exaggerated when Greece has to issue more sovereign debt in later crisis.
Determining Structural Breakpoints
In this section, the tests (as described in section 4.2) of Gregory and Hansen (1996) are applied to detect structural breaks in the log-CDS series. We use the log-CDS series of Greek sovereign debt and Alpha Bank for exposition purpose, and Table 5 shows the results. In Panel A of Table 5 , the results in the ADF, Z t and Z α tests using the regime shift (C/S) model suggest that the breakpoints are on 12 May 2010 and 21
September 2011. The date of the first breakpoint is very close to the first Greek bailout on 9 May 2010.
[Insert Table 5] Likewise, we detect the breakpoints in the CDS series of Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain using the Gregory and Hansen (1996) models. Panel B of Table 5 shows the summary of the level shift (C) and the regime shift (C/S) breakpoints for the GIIPS countries. These significant breakpoints are close to the four bailouts (G1, I, P G2) by the EFSF, indicating that the bailouts change the pattern of interdependencies of the default risk between the sovereign and financial sectors. Thus, setting sub-periods according to the timing of the EFSF bailouts is both intuitive and supported by statistical evidence.
Default Risk Transfer: Pre-and Post-Bailout Periods
As we show earlier, the actual bailout dates are close to the breakpoints of the CDS series, for the time period of the first Greek bailout, we use the G1 issue date (9 May 2010) as the breakpoint for the GIIPS countries and Germany. For later EFSF bailouts (I, P and G2) 9 , sub-periods are set for Greece, Ireland and Portugal according to the country's application and/or bailout dates, respectively. The programme for Ireland has been separated into four sub-periods. The pre-bailout period is separated into the period before application and the application 9 Spain is not included in this section. Although the Spanish government issued the official request for financial bailout to the EFSF on 25 June 2012, the EFSF has not confirmed the settlement dates of bailouts. 10 The first Greek bailout programme has been discontinued, and the remaining amount (€24.4 billion to be disbursed by the Eurozone countries) has been transferred to the EFSF. 11 The sovereign CDS spread of Greece has remained unchanged due to Greek debt restructuring in early March 2012, thus there is no further analysis of Greek risk transfer for the bailout and post-bailout periods during the second Greek bailout. Table 6 reports the results of cointegration analysis for the GIIPS countries and Germany before and after the first Greek bailout issued by the EFSF.
Results of First Greek Bailout
[Insert Table 6 Next, we analyze the results of impulse responses of all the countries (GIIPS and Germany). Table 7 shows the results of IRFs for GIIPS and Germany before and after the first Greek bailout (G1). The responses after 1, 2 and 5 days represent the short-term effects, and the responses after 22 days reveal the long-run effects.
Before G1, the results show that a two-way feedback effect exists for the GIIPS [Insert Table 7] After G1, there is significant effect of default risk transfer in both the short and Also the direct capital injection into the financial sector may not relieve the sovereign debt crisis. Instead, it further magnifies the impacts of sovereign default risk on financial sector through increases in the government debt burdens.
Our results are different from the results of Acharya et al. (2014) . Acharya et al. (2014) find that during the pre-bailout periods, there is no sovereign-to-banking risk transfer, but after the bailout, there is positive risk transfer. We find that, before the first Greek bailout, the sovereign-to-financial and the financial-to-sovereign risk transfer has been positive, indicating that the countries have entered into a feedback loop. After the bailout, however, the financial-to-sovereign risk transfer for the GIIPS countries becomes insignificant or negatively significant. Such results indicate that the GIIPS countries are the main beneficiaries of the bailouts, and the financial-to-sovereign risk transfer in the GIIPS countries breaks down after the bailouts, while the bailouts have less impact on the risk transfer pattern of other bailout guarantees.
Results of Other EFSF Bailouts (Second Greek Bailout, Irish and
Portugal Bailouts) Table 8 [Insert Table 8] The "Greek effect" indicates that the default risk of other countries such as Ireland and Portugal has been priced or perceived by bond investors during the first Greek bailout, and such default risk transfer becomes insignificant when other countries issue their own bailouts. Table 9 [Insert Table 9 ] Table 10 However, in both the application and bailout periods, the responses of the financial sector to the shocks in the sovereign default risk become insignificant, and vice versa.
[Insert Table 10] When sub-periods are reset for Ireland and Portugal according to their own bailouts received, respectively, the default risk transfer from the banking sector to the government is not significant, compared to the results in Section 5.3.1, that the bank-to-government risk transfer is significantly positive. The risk transfer from the financial sector to the sovereign default risk is significant to the countries that have potential defaults, only when the first Greek bailout is issued. Such difference indicates that the risk of default had already been priced for Ireland, Portugal and Spain. Given the Greek experience, bond investors have perceived that these countries might also request and receive the bailouts from the EFSF guarantees in the future. For Ireland and Portugal, the transfer of default risk in the banking sector to the government was priced after the Greek bailout was approved. Thus by the time these countries requested their own bailouts, such effect disappears.
Conclusion
In this paper, we use different approaches to examine the structural changes of the relationship between the sovereign and the financial institutions' CDS series during the European sovereign debt crisis. We first apply a bivariate VEC model with a threshold effect of Hansen and Seo (2002) We then use the models of Gregory and Hansen (1996) to estimate the unknown timing of the structural breaks in each bivariate relationship. We find that the significant breakpoints are close to the four bailouts (G1, I, P G2) carried out by the EFSF. Accordingly, we apply the four bailouts from the EFSF as the breakpoints for all the countries and investigate the changes in the default risk transfer in the preand post-bailout periods.
Before the first Greek bailout (G1), we find that the two-way feedback effect exists between the sovereign and financial sectors in both the short and the long runs.
After the first Greek bailout (G1), the shocks in the financial sector either exert significantly negative impacts or lose influences on the sovereign sector. In a sharp contrast, the later bailouts from the EFSF (G2, I and P) do not show this pattern change in the two-way risk transfer. Importantly, the two-way feedback is not even significant during the pre-bailout periods for the later bailouts.
Our evidence suggests that the first Greek bailout helps alleviate the financial systemic risk and successfully transfers the aggregated sovereign risk to the EFSF, which is supported together by the Eurozone guarantee countries. However, since investors have perceived the forthcoming bailouts, and the two-way risk transfer has been priced after the first Greek bailout, the two-way feedback loop is not shown in later EFSF bailouts.
There are limitations to the EFSF bailout programme, as the EFSF only raises funds after an official aid request is made by a country. The EFSF funds are given to the governments, which in turn bailout individual institutions in the country, leading to increases in the government default risk. The EFSF has been improved to become 
